

READING TEST

Differences Between American and European Farmers

15 Minutes

DIRECTIONS: After reading the following passage, choose the best answer to each question and circle the letter of that answer.

**SOCIAL SCIENCE:** This passage is adapted from Richard Hofstadter's work *The Age of Reform* (©1955 by Richard Hofstadter). The passage discusses some differences between the lifestyles and practices of American and European farmers.

The penchant for speculation and the lure of new and different lands bred in the American farmer a tremendous passion for moving—and not merely, as one common view would have it, on the part of those who had failed, but also on the part of those who had succeeded. For farmers who had made out badly, the fresh lands may have served on occasion as a safety valve, but for others who had made out well enough on a speculative basis, or who were beginning a farming "career," it was equally a risk valve—an opportunity to exploit the full possibilities of the great American land bubble. Mobility among farmers had serious effects upon an agricultural tradition never noted for careful cultivation: in a nation whose soil is notoriously heterogeneous, farmers too often had little chance to get to know the quality of their land; they failed to plan and manure and replenish; they neglected diversification for the one-crop system and ready cash. There was among them little attachment to land or locality; instead there developed the false euphoria of local "boosting," encouraged by the railroads, land companies, and farmers themselves; in place of village contacts and communal spirit based upon ancestral attachments, there was professional optimism based upon hopes for a quick rise in values.

In a very real and profound sense, then, the United States failed to develop (except in some localities, chiefly in the East) a distinctly rural culture. If a rural culture means an emotional and craftsmanlike dedication to the soil, a traditional and pre-capitalistic outlook, a tradition-directed rather than a career-directed type of character, and a village community devoted to ancestral ways and habitually given to communal action, then the prairies and plains never had one. . . .

Immigrant farmers, who really were yeomen with a background of genuine agrarian values, were frequently bewildered at the ethos of American agriculture. Marcus Hansen points out: "The ambition of the German-American father, for instance, was to see his sons on reaching manhood established with their families on farms clustered about his own. To take complete possession of a township with sons, sons-in-law and nephews was not an unrealizable ideal. To this end the would-be patriarch dedicated all his plodding industry. One by one, he bought adjacent farms, the erstwhile owners joining the current to the farther West. Heavily timbered acres and swamp lands which had been lying unused were prepared for cultivation by patient and unceasing toil. . . . But the American father made no such efforts on behalf of his offspring. To be a self-made man was his ideal. He had come in as a 'first settler' and had created a farm with his ax; let the boys do the same. One of them perhaps was kept at home as a helper to his aging parents; the rest set out to achieve beyond the mountains or beyond the river what the father had accomplished in the West of his day. Thus mobility was fostered by family policy." The continuing influx of immigrants, ready to settle on cleared and slightly improved land, greatly facilitated the Yankee race across the continent.

American agriculture was also distinguishable from European agriculture in the kind of rural life . . . it sustained. . . . In Europe land was limited and dear, while labor was abundant and relatively cheap; in America this ration between land and labor was inverted. In Europe small farmers lived in villages, where generations of the same family were reared upon the same soil, and where careful cultivation and the minute elimination of waste were necessary to support a growing population on a limited amount of land. Endless and patient labor, including the labor of peasant women and children exploited to a degree to which the Yankee would not go except under the stress of pioneering conditions, was available to conserve and tailor the

land and keep it fertile. On limited plots cultivated by an ample labor force, the need for machinery was not urgent, and hence the demand for liquid capital in large amounts was rare. Diversification, self-sufficiency, and the acceptance of a low standard of living also contributed to hold down this demand. Much managerial skill was required for such an agricultural regime, but it was the skill of the craftsman and the traditional tiller of the soil. Village life provided a community and a cooperative milieu, a pooling of knowledge and lore, a basis of common action to minimize risks.

In America the greater availability of land and the scarcity of labor made for extensive agriculture, which was wasteful of the soil, and placed a premium on machines to bring large tracts under cultivation. His demand for expensive machinery, his expectation of higher standards of living, and his tendency to go into debt to acquire extensive acreage created an urgent need for cash and tempted the farmer into capitalizing more and more on his greatest single asset: the unearned appreciation in the value of his land. The managerial skill required for success under these conditions was as much businesslike as craftsmanlike. The predominance in American agriculture of the isolated farmstead standing in the midst of great acreage, the frequent movements, the absence of village life, deprived the farmer and his family of the advantages of community, lowered the chances of association and co-operation, and encouraged that rampant, suspicious, and almost suicidal individualism for which the American farmer was long noted and which organizations like the Grange tried to combat. The characteristic product of American rural society was not a yeoman or a village, but a harassed little country businessman who worked very hard, moved all too often, gambled with his land, and made his way alone.

- In line 16, the author describes American soil as "notoriously heterogeneous" to convey the idea that the quality of American soil:
  - was unusually high.
  - was unusually poor.
  - deteriorated rapidly under abuse.
  - varied widely from region to region.
- According to the passage, which of the following is necessary for the development of a "distinctly rural culture" (lines 31-32)?
  - A communal spirit
  - Respect for tradition
  - Fresh lands to serve as a risk valve

- I only
- I and II only
- II and III only
- I, II, and III

- The passage suggests that when German-American farmers bought neighboring farms in America, their chief motivation was:
  - to increase the value of their land holdings.
  - to protect the investment they had originally made.
  - to allow for the creation of a family-based community.
  - to provide the opportunity for greater crop diversification.
- The passage suggests that a sense of community can develop in rural places only if there is:
  - little cultural diversity.
  - great cultural diversity.
  - a high demand for labor.
  - a sense of stability and constancy.
- According to the passage, all of the following conditions contributed to the careful cultivation of European farmlands EXCEPT:
  - the practice of buying adjacent farmlands.
  - the managerial skill of farmers.
  - the abundance of cheap labor.
  - the scarcity of land.
- According to the passage, the most important factor in determining an American farmer's mobility was which of the following?
  - The farmer's age
  - The farmer's experience
  - The farmer's traditional values
  - The farmer's degree of success
- In this passage, the author views the independent streak of native-born farmers as a:
  - complete mystery.
  - trait common to all Americans.
  - logical result of their mode of life.
  - trait deeply rooted in European agricultural practices.
- According to the passage, the abundance of land and the scarcity of agricultural labor on the frontier led to which of the following?
  - A need for machinery
  - A need for liquid capital
  - Cultivation of extensive tracts of land
  - A habitual reliance on communal action
  - I and III only
  - II and III only
  - I, II, and III only
  - I, II, III, and IV

## Wilson, Neutrality, and Intervention

When World War I began in Europe, President Woodrow Wilson, who had been elected on the strength of his Progressive principles, pledged to keep the United States neutral. The reversal of his position had serious consequences for the nation as well as for the Progressive movement.

In the course of the long struggle over neutrality Wilson is the key figure, not merely because of the central power of leadership he exercised but because he was, on this issue, a representative American and a good Progressive citizen who expressed in every inconsistency, every vacillation, every reluctance, the predominant feelings of the country. He embodied, too, the triumph of the Progressive need to phrase the problems of national policy in moral terms. At first, while sharing the common reluctance to become involved in the struggle, he eschewed the "realistic" formula that the whole struggle was none of America's business and that the essence of the American problem was to stay out at all costs. Even his plea for neutrality was pitched in high moral terms: the nation must stay out in order to be of service, to provide a center of sanity uncorrupted by the strains and hatreds of belligerence. . . .

Then, as the country drew closer to involvement under the pressure of events, Wilson again chose the language of idealism to formulate the American problem—the problem not only whether the United States should intervene, but what might be the valid reasons for intervening. One view . . . rested chiefly upon the national interest and cool calculations of the future advantage of the United States. According to this view, a victory for imperial Germany would represent a threat to the long-term interests of the United States in some sense that a victory for the Allies would not. It was expected that a victorious Germany would be more aggressive, more formidable, more anti-American, and that after the defeat of the Allies and the surrender of the British fleet it would either turn upon the United States at some future time or at least present so forceful and continuous a threat as to compel this country to remain a perpetual armed camp in order to protect its security. Therefore, it was argued, it was the

business of the United States, as a matter of self-interest to see to it that the Allies were not defeated—acting if possible as a nonbelligerent, but if necessary as a belligerent. Another view was that intervention in the war could not properly be expressed in such calculating and self-regarding terms, but must rest upon moral and ideological considerations—the defense of international law and freedom of the seas, the rights of small nations, the fight against autocracy and militarism, the struggle to make the world safe for democracy. To be sure, the argument from self-preservation and national interest and the argument from morals and ideals were not mutually contradictory, and both tended to have a place in the course of public discussion. But Wilson's course, the characteristically Progressive course, was to minimize and subordinate the self-regarding considerations, and to place American intervention upon the loftiest possible plane. He committed himself to this line of action quite early in the game when he rested so much of his diplomacy on the issue of the conduct of German submarine warfare and the freedom of the seas. This was quixotically formulated because it linked the problem of American intervention or non-intervention to an issue of international law—though one entirely congenial to the Progressive concern over lawlessness. To Wilson's critics it seemed hypocritical because in purely formal terms British violations of maritime law were about as serious as German violations. American concern over them could never be pressed so vigorously because such a course of action would trip over the more urgent desire to do nothing to impair the chances of Allied victory. . . .

Not long after they began to pay the price of war, the [American] people began to feel that they had been gulled by its promoters both among the Allies and in the United States. . . . The war purged the pent-up guilts, shattered the ethos of



GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE

- responsibility that had permeated the rhetoric of more than a decade. It convinced the people that they had paid the price for such comforts of modern life as they could claim, that they had
- 85 finally answered to the full the Progressive demand for sacrifice and self-control and altruism. In repudiating Wilson, the treaty, the League [of Nations], and the war itself, they repudiated the Progressive rhetoric and the Progressive mood—
- 90 for it was Wilson himself and his propagandists who had done so much to tie all these together. . . . The reaction went farther than this: it destroyed the popular impulse that had sustained Progressive politics for well over a decade before 1914. The
- 95 pressure for civic participation was followed by widespread apathy, the sense of responsibility by neglect, the call for sacrifice by hedonism.
1. The author feels that Wilson's struggle with neutrality was mainly a struggle with his
    - (A) ego or pride
    - (B) past experiences
    - (C) political opponents
    - (D) sense of patriotic duty
    - (E) intellect and conscience
  2. The "realistic" (line 13) point of view held that America should stay out of the war because
    - (A) the war was evil
    - (B) the war was a European matter
    - (C) public opinion was strongly antiwar
    - (D) both sides had violated maritime laws
    - (E) America wasn't prepared to fight a war
  3. In this passage, the author chiefly characterizes the Progressives during the years before the war as being
    - (A) rigid
    - (B) logical
    - (C) idealistic
    - (D) insincere
    - (E) compassionate
  4. In line 12, "eschewed" most nearly means
    - (A) avoided
    - (B) stressed
    - (C) faced up to
    - (D) understood
    - (E) contradicted
  5. The author suggests that using an issue of international law to justify American intervention in the war was Wilson's way of
    - (A) inspiring the American people to support the war effort
    - (B) attempting to limit the scope of American involvement in the war
    - (C) answering critics who accused him of showing a lack of concern over lawlessness
    - (D) making American involvement seem consistent with idealism rather than self-interest
    - (E) convincing the American people of the threat they faced from a potential German victory
  6. In the last paragraph, the author argues that Progressivism was ultimately undone by its
    - (A) early support of neutrality
    - (B) association with an unpopular war
    - (C) excessive demands for self-sacrifice
    - (D) rejection of the realities of modern life
    - (E) inability to wholeheartedly support the war
  7. In the last sentence, the author uses a series of contrasts to show
    - (A) what should have been versus what was
    - (B) how Americans became divided by the war
    - (C) how American attitudes and behavior changed
    - (D) the conflict between morality and practicality
    - (E) the realities that lay behind Progressive propaganda

## READING TEST

## Causes and Effects of the Great Depression

15 Minutes

**DIRECTIONS:** After reading the following passage, choose the best answer to each question and circle the letter of that answer.

**SOCIAL SCIENCE:** This passage is adapted from *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914–32* by William E. Leuchtenburg (©1958 by The University of Chicago). The passage discusses some of the causes and effects of the Great Depression.

The prosperity of the 1920s had been founded on construction and the automobile industry. Residential construction, which had stood at five billion dollars in 1925, was down to three billion  
5 by 1929. The automobile industry continued to grow, but after 1925, it grew at a much slower rate, cutting back purchases of steel and other material; the cycle of events, whereby an increase in car production produces rapid increases in  
10 steel, rubber, glass, and other industries, now operated in a reverse manner to speed the country toward a major depression. By 1929 the automobile industry—and satellites like the rubber-tire business—were badly overbuilt. Since  
15 there was no new industry to take the place of automobiles and no policy of federal spending to provide new investment . . . , it was inevitable that as investment fell off and the rate of production slackened in the key industries, a  
20 serious recession would result.

There was no single cause of the [1929 stock market] crash and the ensuing depression, but much of the responsibility for both falls on the foolhardy assumption that the special interests of  
25 business and the national interest were identical. Management had siphoned off gains in productivity in high profits, while the farmer got less, and the worker, though better off, received wage increases disproportionately small when  
30 compared to profits. As a result the purchasing power of workers and farmers was not great enough to sustain prosperity. For a time this was partly obscured by the fact that consumers bought goods on installment at a rate faster than  
35 their income was expanding, but it was inevitable that a time would come when they would have to reduce purchases, and the cutback in buying would sap the whole economy.

With no counteraction from labor unions,  
40 which were weak, or from government, which had no independent policy, business increased profits at twice the rate of the growth in productivity. So great were profits that many corporations no longer needed to borrow, and as a result Federal  
45 Reserve banks had only minimal control over speculation. With no other outlet, profits were plunged into the stock market, producing runaway speculation.

The policies of the federal government in the  
50 1920s were disastrous. Its tax policies made the maldistribution of income and oversaving by the rich still more serious. . . . Its monetary policies were irresponsible; at critical junctures, the fiscal policy of the Coolidge administration moved in  
55 precisely the wrong direction. The administration took the narrow interests of business groups to be the national interest, and the result was catastrophic.

The market crash played a major role in  
60 precipitating the Great Depression. It shattered business confidence, ruined many investors, and wiped out holding company and investment trust structures. It destroyed an important source of long-term capital and sharply cut back consumer  
65 demand. Yet business would have been able to weather even the shock of the crash, if business had been fundamentally sound. The crash exposed the weaknesses that underlay the prosperous economy of the twenties—the over-  
70 expansion of major industries, the maldistribution of income, the weak banking structure, and the overdependence of the economy on consumer durable goods.

During the 1920s almost seven thousand  
75 banks failed; no industrial nation in the world had as unstable and as irresponsible a banking system as the United States. "The banks," noted one writer, "provided everything for their customers but a roulette wheel." In the 1920s  
80 wrote Professor Schumpeter, "a new type of bank

executive emerged who had little of the banker and looked much like a bond salesman"; the new type of banker-promoter financed speculation and loaded the banks with dubious assets. Nothing did  
85 more to turn the stock market crash of 1929 into a prolonged depression than the destruction of business and public morale by the failure of the banks.

A year after the crash, six million men walked  
90 the streets looking for work. By 1932, there were 660,000 jobless in Chicago, a million in New York City. In heavily industrialized cities the toll of the depression read, as one observer noted, like British casualty lists at the Somme—so awesome as to  
95 become in the end meaningless, for the sheer statistics numbed the mind. . . . In the three years after the crash, 100,000 workers were fired on the average every week.

By 1932, the physical output of manufacturing  
100 had fallen to 54 per cent of what it had been in 1929; it was a shade less than production in 1913. All the gains of the golden twenties were wiped out in a few months. By the last year of the Hoover administration, the automobile industry was  
105 operating at only one-fifth of its 1929 capacity. As the great auto plants in Detroit lay idle, fires were banked in the steel furnaces on the Allegheny and the Mahoning. By the summer of 1932, steel plants operated at 12 per cent of capacity . . .

The farmer, who had seen little of the  
110 prosperity of the 1920s, was devastated by the depression. The crash—and the ensuing financial debacle—destroyed much of what remained of his foreign markets. American foreign trade declined  
115 from \$10 billion in 1929 to \$3 billion in 1932. . . . As foreign nations erected new barriers to American products and unemployment cut heavily into the domestic market, crop prices skidded to new lows. . . . The result was catastrophic. Gross  
120 farm income fell from nearly \$12 billion to the pitiful sum of \$5 billion.

1. The quotation in lines 77–79 is used by the author to illustrate the point that:

- A. banks weren't taking customer service seriously.
- B. banks were desperate to attract new customers.
- C. banks were encouraging consumers to gamble with their money.
- D. consumers were being offered more banking choices than ever before.

2. It can reasonably be inferred from the passage that, in the 1920s, government worked primarily for the benefit of:

- F. farmers.
- G. business
- H. unionized workers.
- J. non-unionized workers.

3. According to the passage, the average worker in the mid-1920s was:

- A. earning less than ever before.
- B. saving more than he or she was spending.
- C. spending more than he or she was making.
- D. investing too heavily in the stock market.

4. According to the passage, part of the problem with business profits in the 1920s was that they:

- F. made labor unions weak.
- G. failed to keep up with wages.
- H. encouraged stock market speculation.
- J. encouraged consumers to buy on installment.

5. According to the author, the stock market crash:

- A. had no effect on the Great Depression.
- B. was the only cause of the Great Depression.
- C. was the main cause of the Great Depression.
- D. was one of the causes of the Great Depression.

6. According to the passage, the economy of the 1920s would have been more stable if:

- I. wages had been distributed more evenly.
- II. the wealthy had put more income into savings.
- III. business productivity had matched business profits.

- F. I and II only
- G. I and III only
- H. II and III only
- J. I, II, and III

7. The author believes that the economic situation of the 1920s would have been improved if:

- A. major industries had expanded.
- B. wages had increased less rapidly.
- C. more people had invested in stocks.
- D. income had been distributed more equally.

8. According to the passage, the Great Depression caused:

- I. high rates of inflation.
- II. high rates of unemployment.
- III. a decrease in world trade.
- IV. runaway speculation in the stock market.

- F. I and II only
- G. II and III only
- H. III and IV only
- J. I, II, III, and IV

9. In the first paragraph, the author suggests that "a serious recession would result" from decreases in all of the following EXCEPT:

- A. retail prices of new automobiles.
- B. consumer demand for automobiles.
- C. the number of automobiles being produced.
- D. residential construction.

**The Atomic Bomb**

On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped, on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, the first atomic bomb used in warfare. Three days later, a second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. This passage conveys the thoughts of Winston Churchill, the prime minister of Great Britain, upon learning of the first successful test explosion of the atomic bomb on July 17, 1945.

On July 17 world-shaking news arrived. In the afternoon Stimson called at my abode and laid before me a sheet of paper on which was written, "Babies satisfactorily born." By his manner I saw something extraordinary had happened. "It means," he said, "that the experiment in the Mexican desert has come off. The atomic bomb is a reality." Although we had followed this dire quest with every scrap of information imparted to us, we had not been told beforehand, or at any rate I did not know, the date of the decisive trial. No responsible scientist would predict what would happen when the first full-scale atomic explosion was tried. Were these bombs useless or were they annihilating? Now we knew. The "babies" had been "satisfactorily born." No one could yet measure the immediate military consequences of the discovery . . .

Next morning a plane arrived with a full description of this tremendous event in the human story. Stimson brought me the report. I tell the tale as I recall it. The bomb, or its equivalent, had been detonated at the top of a pylon one hundred feet high. Everyone had been cleared away for ten miles round, and the scientists and their staffs crouched behind massive concrete shields and shelters at about that distance. The blast had been terrific. An enormous column of flame and smoke shot up to the fringe of the atmosphere of our poor earth. Devastation inside a one-mile circle was absolute. Here then was a speedy end to the Second World War, and perhaps to much else besides.

[President Truman] invited me to confer with him forthwith. . . . Up to this moment we had shaped our ideas towards an assault upon the homeland of Japan by terrific air bombing and by the invasion of very large armies. We had contemplated the desperate resistance of the

Japanese fighting to the death with Samurai devotion, not only in pitched battles, but in every cave and dugout. I had in my mind the spectacle of Okinawa island, where many thousands of Japanese, rather than surrender, had drawn up in line and destroyed themselves by hand-grenades after their leaders had solemnly performed the rite of hara-kiri. To quell the Japanese resistance man by man and conquer the country yard by yard might well require the loss of a million American lives and half that number of British—or more if we could get them there: for we were resolved to share the agony. Now all this nightmare picture had vanished. In its place was the vision—fair and bright indeed it seemed—of the end of the whole war in one or two violent shocks. I thought immediately myself of how the Japanese people, whose courage I had always admired, might find in the apparition of this almost supernatural weapon an excuse which would save their honour and release them from their obligation of being killed to the last fighting man.

Moreover, we should not need the Russians. The end of the Japanese war no longer depended upon the pouring in of their armies for the final and perhaps protracted slaughter. We had no need to ask favours of them. The array of European problems could therefore be faced on their merits and according to the broad principles of the United Nations. We seemed suddenly to have become possessed of a merciful abridgment of the slaughter in the East and of a far happier prospect in Europe. I have no doubt that these thoughts were present in the minds of my American friends. At any rate, there never was a moment's discussion as to whether the atomic bomb should be used or not. To avert a vast, indefinite butchery, to bring the war to an end, to give peace to the world, to lay healing hands upon its tortured peoples by a manifestation of overwhelming power at the cost of a few explosions, seemed, after all our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance.

**GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE**

British consent in principle to the use of the weapon had been given on July 4, before the test had taken place. The final decision now lay in the  
 85 main with President Truman, who had the weapon; but I never doubted what it would be, nor have I ever doubted since that he was right. The historic fact remains, and must be judged in the aftertime, that the decision whether or not to use the atomic  
 90 bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never an issue. There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement around our table; nor did I ever hear the slightest suggestion that we should do otherwise.

95 A more intricate question was what to tell Stalin. The President and I no longer felt we needed his aid to conquer Japan. . . . [A] continuous movement of Russian troops to the Far East had been in progress over the Siberian Railway since  
 100 the beginning of May. In our opinion they were not likely to be needed, and Stalin's bargaining power, which he had used with effect . . . was therefore gone. Still, he had been a magnificent ally in the war against Hitler, and we both felt that he must  
 105 be informed of the great New Fact which now dominated the scene, but not of any particulars. . . . "I think," [the President] said, "I had best just tell him . . . that we have an entirely novel form of bomb, something quite out of the ordinary, which  
 110 we think will have decisive effects upon the Japanese will to continue the war." I agreed to this procedure.

- Approximately how much time passed between the first successful test of the atomic bomb and the first use of the bomb on Japan?
  - one day
  - three days
  - three weeks
  - two months
  - three months
- The first paragraph suggests that the test explosion was performed in order to
  - persuade Japan to surrender immediately
  - convince Churchill of the bomb's power
  - test the effects of the bomb on humans
  - decide where an explosion would be most effective
  - determine how destructive the bomb was
- Churchill's description of the test explosion suggests that the scientists at the test site reacted to the test results with
  - horror
  - satisfaction
  - disappointment
  - disbelief
  - frustration

- Which did NOT occur prior to the test of the atomic bomb in the desert?
  - British and American troops began an invasion of Japan.
  - Russian troops began moving toward Japan.
  - The Japanese were defeated on Okinawa island.
  - Britain gave its approval to using an atomic bomb in the war.
  - Truman and Churchill conferred on a plan to defeat Japan.
- In line 70, "abridgment" most nearly means
  - method
  - uncertainty
  - increase
  - reduction
  - decision
- In the passage, Churchill stresses the idea that the main reason to use the atomic bomb was that
  - no country would ever again challenge the power of democratic nations
  - use of the bomb was consistent with the principles of the United Nations
  - although more Japanese would die, far fewer British and American lives would be lost
  - failing to do so would give the Russians too much authority in the war effort
  - doing so would save the lives of many Allied and Japanese troops
- Churchill's feelings toward Stalin could be best described as
  - indifferent
  - sympathetic
  - respectful but wary
  - cordial and admiring
  - frightened and alarmed
- The passage suggests that, before using the bomb, it was important to Truman to obtain
  - Stalin's consent to its use
  - Churchill's consent to its use
  - the United Nations' consent to its use
  - a Russian commitment to fight Japan
  - agreement on a postwar plan for Europe



## READING TEST

## Industrial Revolution: Child Labor

15 Minutes

**DIRECTIONS:** This test has one passage followed by ten multiple choice questions. After reading the passage, choose the best answer to each question and circle the letter of that answer. Refer to the passage as often as you wish while answering the questions.

Work in the coal breakers is exceedingly hard and dangerous. Crouched over the chutes, the boys sit hour after hour, picking out the pieces of slate and other refuse from the coal as it rushes past to the washers. From the cramped position they have to assume, most of them become more or less deformed and bent-backed like old men. When a boy has been working for some time and begins to get round-shouldered, his fellows say that "He's got his boy to carry round whenever he goes."

The coal is hard, and accidents to the hands, such as cut, broken, or crushed fingers, are common among the boys. Sometimes there is a worse accident: a terrified shriek is heard, and a boy is mangled and torn in the machinery, or disappears in the chute to be picked out later smothered and dead. Clouds of dust fill the breakers and are inhaled by the boys, laying the foundations for asthma and miners' consumption.

I once stood in a breaker for half an hour and tried to do the work a twelve-year-old boy was doing day after day, for ten hours at a stretch, for sixty cents a day. The gloom of the breaker appalled me. Outside the sun shone brightly, the air was pellucid, and the birds sang in chorus with the trees and the rivers. Within the breaker there was blackness, clouds of deadly dust enfolded everything, the harsh, grinding roar of the machinery and the ceaseless rushing of coal through the chutes filled the ears. I tried to pick out the pieces of slate from the hurrying stream of coal, often missing them; my hands were bruised and cut in a few minutes; I was covered from head to foot with coal dust, and for many hours afterwards I was expectorating some of the small particles of anthracite I had swallowed.

I could not do that work and live, but there were boys of ten and twelve years of age doing it for fifty and sixty cents a day. Some of them had never been inside of a school; few of them could read a child's primer. True, some of them attended

the night schools, but after working ten hours in the breaker the educational results from attending school were practically nil. . . .

45 As I stood in that breaker I thought of the reply of the small boy to Robert Owen. Visiting an English coal mine one day, Owen asked a twelve-year-old lad if he knew God. The boy stared vacantly at his questioner: "God?" he said, "God? No I don't. He must work in some other mine." It was hard to realize amid the danger and the din and blackness of that Pennsylvania breaker that such a thing as belief in a great All-good God existed.

55 From the breakers the boys graduate to the mine depths, where they become door tenders, switch boys, or mule drivers. Here, far below the surface, work is still more dangerous. At fourteen or fifteen the boys assume the same risks as the men, and are surrounded by the same perils. Nor it is in Pennsylvania only that these conditions exist. In the bituminous mines of West Virginia, boys of nine or ten are frequently employed. I met one little fellow ten years old in Mt. Carbon, West Virginia, last year, who was employed as a "trap boy." Think of what it means to be a trap boy at ten years of age. It means to sit alone in a dark mine passage hour after hour, with no human soul near; to see no living creature except the mules as they pass with their loads, or a rat or two seeking to share one's meal; to stand in water or mud that covers the ankles, chilled to the marrow by the cold draughts that rush in when you open the trap door for the mules to pass through; to work for fourteen hours—waiting—opening and shutting a door—then waiting again—for sixty cents; to reach the surface when all is wrapped in the mantle of night, and to fall to the earth exhausted and have to be carried away to the nearest "shack" to be revived before it is possible to walk to the farther shack called "home."

Boys twelve years of age may be *legally* employed in the mines of West Virginia, by day or  
 85 by night, and for as many hours as the employers care to make them toil or their bodies will stand the strain. Where the disregard of child life is such that this may be done openly and with legal sanction, it is easy to believe what miners have  
 90 again and again told me that there are hundreds of little boys of nine and ten years of age employed in the coal mines of this state.

from John Spargo, *The Bitter Cry of the Children* (New York: Macmillan, 1906), 163-165.

- The main purpose of this passage is to:
  - convince mine owners in Pennsylvania and West Virginia to close the mines.
  - get higher wages for the children.
  - expose hazardous working conditions for children in the coal mines.
  - encourage more children to attend school.
- The author uses the quotation in lines 9 and 10 to illustrate the fact that:
  - young boys recognized the consequences of the conditions under which they worked.
  - despite dangerous working conditions, young miners kept their senses of humor.
  - men often carried the boys into the mines on their backs.
  - boys were frequently killed by the machinery.
- According to the passage, when boys reached the ages of 14 or 15, they worked:
  - in the coal breakers separating the coal.
  - as trap boys.
  - in the coal chutes with the machinery.
  - alongside the men below the surface.
- The passage suggests that in the early 1900s:
  - young children were not allowed to join labor unions.
  - young girls could work in textile factories, but not in coal mines.
  - boys competed with each other to obtain work in the coal mines.
  - state legislatures had not passed child labor laws.
- According to the passage, all of the following as conditions applied to the work of a trap boy EXCEPT:
  - feeling lonely and cold.
  - standing ankle-deep in water.
  - being mangled by machinery.
  - working long hours in darkness.
- In lines 45-54, the conversation between Robert Owen and the child miner is used to illustrate the author's observation that the child:
  - had not been taught Christian religion.
  - could not read the Bible.
  - was rude because he had no education.
  - could not hear the question over the din of the machinery.
- The author was especially understanding of the plight of the children working in the mines because:
  - his own family could not live on sixty cents a day.
  - he had spent part of a day picking out pieces of slate from coal.
  - he had a terrible accident in an English coal mine.
  - he suffered miner's consumption.
- In line 44, the word "nil" is used to describe the:
  - number of children attending night school.
  - ability of children to learn after working all day.
  - number of children who could read a primer.
  - quality of education in Pennsylvania and West Virginia.
- According to the passage, which of the following conditions contributed to the bleak existence of child miners?
  - Poor housing
  - Exhausting work
  - Lack of fellowship
  - Pellucid air in the mines
  - I and II only
  - I and III only
  - II and III only
  - I, II, and III only
- In this passage, the author views mine owners
  - appalled by the living conditions of mining families.
  - supportive of higher wages.
  - unconcerned about child welfare.
  - unaware of accidents in the coal breakers.